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he subject I have been asked to address, the moral
responsibility of law schools, is perplexing, less
because answers to the implicit question are uncertain than because the meaning of the question itself
is unclear. Our ideas about moral responsibility have
been formed in reference to individuals. They presuppose the existence of distinctively human
characteristics such as understanding or will. What,
then, can be meant by the moral responsibility of
"law schools," institutions that, just because they are
not human, necessarily lack these capacities?
The attribution of moral responsibility to law
F
schools can best be understood metaphorically, as a
device for drawing attention to moral issues that arise
in the operation of the schools. Despite the contrary
assumption of some contemporary critics of legal
education, the existence of such issues is not a recent
discovery. Still, each generation must find its own
way to and through the moral issues it confronts, and
in ours the metaphor of institutional moral responsibility is for many an especially attractive path. It is
worth inquiring briefly why that should be so.
It is a commonplace that we live in an age of large
organizations, an age in which the pursuit of our
goals requires collective action. Automobiles cannot
be built, nor the next generation educated, by individuals acting alone or in small groups. Many of the
problems that beset us-the threat of war, poverty
and pollution, a malfunctioning legal system-cannot
be fully understood, let alone addressed, except by
the concerted efforts of many people. And so, large
organizations are established to act on our behalf.
It is an increasingly common perception, however,
that those organizations are themselves the source
of many contemporary problems. These latter problems do not exist because any individual has willed
them into existence, but because many individuals
have acted subject to the pressures and with the limited perspectives and authority incident to their
institutional positions. Each may thus contribute to
bringing about results that all regard as undesirable.
In these circumstances, the appeal of the metaphor of
institutional responsibility is evident. It asserts the
importance of an institutional capacity to identify and
address the moral issues that confront institutions.
The scale at which legal education is conducted
would not lead one to anticipate that it would face
similar difficulties, but the metaphor has proved to
be attractive even there. A principal reason is that,
despite their modest size, law schools have in recent
years revealed an inadequate capacity to address
issues that are central to their existence.
The most important of these issues concern the
schools' educational programs. Roger Cramton,
among others, has drawn attention to the disarray of
what is still, though now euphemistically, called the
curriculum. The state of the curriculum is, however,
only symptomatic of a larger failure, the seeming
inability of law schools to address fundamental issues
concerning the goals of legal education.
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The assertion that schools are not addressing those
issues requires a word of explanation, since it is
undoubtedly true that more, and more intelligent,
writing about legal education has been published
during the past fifteen years than during the previous
one hundred. It would be difficult to maintain, however, that this outpouring of books and articles has
led to the adoption of educational programs that
embody a coherent vision of the purposes of legal
education. The considerable amount of curricular
innovation during the period suggests only that law
schools are prepared to accept, willy-nilly, whatever
new ideas may be advanced about the educational
needs of students.
Are there lawyers or judges or students who argue
that fledgling lawyers should know how to try a case?
If so, open a clinic or establish a trial advocacy course
to develop the necessary skills. Are there others who
believe that lawyers require greater familiarity with
alternative methods of dispute resolution? Then start
a course in negotiation or in arbitration or perhaps in
both. Are there still others who think that lawyers
require an understanding of economics or sociology
or political philosophy? They too can be accommodated. Of course, we have still not provided for the
young man or woman who cares deeply about children's rights and cannot find within the law school a
faculty member who shares the interest or sufficient
courses to permit study of the subject in depth. Happily, this need too can be met: authorize a semester
of credit for an externship at the Children's Defense
Fund.
Each of these curricular innovations doubtless
offers students opportunities for useful learning, but
they do not demonstrate that law schools are addressing fundamental issues regarding the objectives of
legal education. The ease with which we have accommodated so many disparate pressures bespeaks,
rather, a failure to attend to questions about the
objectives of legal education and to confront the hard
choices that are required in allocating our scarcest
resources, the time, energy, and attention of
students.
Although responsibility for the educational program rests with the faculty, it would be simplistic to
conclude that its failings are simply the faculty's fault.
They are, rather, the product of a number of cultural
and societal trends whose effects extend well beyond
legal education. I want to draw attention to one that
has particular relevance to the issues underlying the
metaphor of institutional responsibility.
Sociologists of academic life have described the
transfer of faculty members' attention and allegiance,
from their schools to their scholarly disciplines, that
occurred in the decades following World War 11.
Within law schools, the transfer is at least partidy
responsible for a number of happy consequences,
including a significant increase in the range and
power of legal scholarship. But it has also contributed
to a decline in the attention given to issues that must

be addressed at the Level of the sehool, primdy
issues regarding each school's educational program.
The pmbEem is not, as is commonly supposed by
those outside the university, that increased attention
to scholarship has d e the faculty less conscientious
teachers. It is, ratherFthat the concentration of faculty
members upon their fields of specialization has influr
enced their unde~standingof the objectives of legal
education and diverted their attention from issues
that must be addressed collectively. The overlapping
and lack of cuordinatian among comes, the absence
ofrequirements beyond the first year, and the steady
increase in the number of hours allocated to the specialized courses typicdy offered in the second and
third years are predictable characteristics of o curricu1u.m the cantent of which is determined by fadties
whose members, however conscientious they may be
as teachers, are.primarily engaged in their scholarly
specialties.
The effeets of specialization go deeper, however.
F a d t y members concerned prharily with their
scholarly specialties we likely to direct their courses
toward enhancing student understanding of those
specidties rather than concerning themselves with the
broader objectives of legal education and with the
contributions that their courses might make to the
achievement of those objectives.
A legal education thus comes to be understood as
the completion d some number d courses that happen to be taught at a law school. Whatever can
plausibly be asserted to have some relationship to the
study or practice of law has a place, but except in
the accasional debates ouem the courses to be required
in the fint year, each element of the pro^" is
cansidered on its own terms. Such a "program"
wndmbtedly offers students much that is of value,
and there is every reason to believe that students
benefit from it. It nevertheless lacks a guiding purpose; it la&, that is, a necessary element of any
moral turdmakiag.
As a complete description of legal education, this is
no doubt too stiuk, but not, I fear, very much so.
Legal education's winter of discontent, as my cdleague Francis Men has described the malaise of the
past fifteen years, is a reality with which we are all
familiar; it has, after all, even been noticod by the
New York Zmes. The s m e of that malaise is a failure
of pwwe, and our discomfiwe is not likely to o l d
anti1 we have s u c e d d in reestaMishing. a sense
of purpose, and therefore a mord foundation, for tl.enterprise in which we are engaged.
The recovery of purpose will require that we open
for discussion issues that have been neglefted for too
long. Central among those is the question of haw
students are to be regarded. I can make the pht
best by considering the underlying attitudes toward
students revealed in three recent pr-als
for
reforming legal educatian, proposaEs that I have
selected not because they are unique but hcause of
the very considerable attention each has received.

In a series of articles and sp&cs during thp pa&
decade, Chief Jrnstiee Wanen Burger hos been h d p
critical of the quality of advocacy in the nation's trial
ccxurb The deficiencies of the trial bar, he has
argued, contribute to court congestion, the high cost
of litigation, and a failure to protect adequately the
interests of clients. Among khe remedies the Chief
Justice has recommended is a reorientation of legal
education designed to improve the competence of
trial lawyers.
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tudents ought not to be regarded
merely ag instruments, however; not
even in the setting of a professional school.
They are, in Kant's familiar formulation,
"ends in themselves and sources o f value in

Harvard's President Derek Bok has advanced a
more comprehensive set of criticisms, aimed less at
the profession-though it does not escape his censure-than at the legal system. Among the criticisms he advances are an overreliance upon litigation
to resolve disputes and the failure to develop effective, less costly means than now exist to vindicate
legal rights, esp@ally for people of moderate means.
Bok also looks to legal education as a partial remedy
for the ills he perceives. "If law schools are to do
their share in attacking the basic problems of our
legal system," he maintains, "they will need to adapt
their teaching. . . ." He advocates dwotmg a larger
part of the d c u l u m to the methods of mediation
and negotiation, and "drawing upon the services of
second- and third-year law students" to help "create
new institutions more efficient than traditional law
firms in delivering legal services to the poor and middle class."
Duncan Kennedy has bigger fish to fry. His criticisms iue not directed merely at the profession or the
legal system, but at the entire social order in which
they are embedded. In a measured, one might say a
subtle and nuanced, assessment, he opines that "our
society is rotkn through and through. . . ." His proposals for reforming legal education are cast
accordingly; though they are too complex to describe
in detail, I think Professor Kennedy would not object
to my characterizing them as aimed at creating the
intellectual vanguard of a movement to dismantle the
existing social system, in the hope, though not necessarily with the expectation, that something better
I

would follow. For reasons that he does not elaborate,
Kennedy regards these proposals as appropriate for
implementation only at a "relatively large, elite law
school, operating as part of a private university."
My purpose in reminding you of these proposals
for reforming legal education is to draw attention to a
premise that is common to all three. So far as one
can judge from what they have written, each of the
critics begins with the assumption that legal education should aim at fitting law students to the
professional roles that the latter will, or that it is
thought they should, play upon graduation. On that
premise students are but instruments of the societyor, for Professor Kennedy, perhaps missiles to be
hurled against it. Vocationalism is so pervasive in
American education that many will regard the premise as unexceptionable, especially in the setting of a
professional school.
Students ought not to be regarded merely as instruments, however; not even in the setting of a
professional school. They are, in Kant's familiar formulation, "ends in themselves and sources of value
in their own right." The notion that a legal education
is merely instrumental, that its aim is merely to equip
students to fulfill the professional obligations that
they will eventually undertake, rests upon a confusion of thought. It does not follow from the fact that
our students will shortly undertake professional obligations of service that we are entitled to treat them as
instruments. Their status as persons, as sources of
value rather than merely a means by which value is
attained, is diminished if we abstract from them the
roles they later will play in relation to others, seeking
only to equip them for those roles. Appropriate
respect for them as persons requires that we take as
the main object of legal education the enhancement
of their capacity to realize their human potential as
that is understood in our culture.
If we are to treat our students as ends, whose education is important because of the contribution it
can make to their lives, we need to ask what opportunities the study of law affords for developing
capacities and knowledge that are valuable in their
own right, not only in the eight or ten or twelve
hours a day in which the students, upon graduation,
will be serving in professional roles. As a way of
giving content to this very general statement, I shall
consider, briefly and illustratively, some goals at
which a legal education so conceived might aim. In
deference to the theme of this afternoon's program, I
shall emphasize the moral dimensions of these goals,
but it is useful to recognize that there are other ways
in which they might be discussed.
At one time, there would have been widespread
agreement that, as Herbert Spencer put it,
"[elducation has for its object the formation of character." In the sense that Spencer employed it, the
word "character" is not heard very often these days.
So used, it has a musty quality that is less likely to
inspire than to evoke a faint smile. The loss of mean-

ing is regrettable, for the word captured an
aggregation of qualities that are highly useful in sustaining a life.
A man or woman of character has a moral code,
but he or she also has something more, the personal
strengths that are necessary to steadfastness of purpose in the face of life's vicissitudes. Disappointment,
embarrassment, boredom, fear, pain, and temptation
are obstacles to the attainment of our goals. They
are also part of the common experience of mankind.
Courage, patience, perseverance, and other qualities
that enable us to overcome these impediments are,
for that reason, universally regarded as virtues, and
since they are necessary to the success of any sustained moral undertaking, they have a special claim
to our attention.
Inculcation of these virtues is a traditional aim of
education, one that deserves greater emphasis than it
has received in legal education. Law schools are not,
to be sure, well positioned to play a decisive role in
forming their students' characters. Students come
to law school as adults. The deplorable faculty-student ratio at all law schools largely precludes a level
of personal contact that might permit faculty members to become an important personal influence in
the lives of their students. Still, the limited potential
of legal education for influencing the development
of character does not justify a conclusion that it is
irrelevant to that development. As Joseph Schwab,
professor of natural sciences and of education at the
University of Chicago, has written, character traits
llke those we are considering are "enhanced only by
undertaking and sustaining the actions pertaining
to [them] to the point of perceiving and enjoying the
enhanced competence which results." By availing
ourselves of the opportunities that legal education
affords for leading students to such actions, we can
help to strengthen those traits. The opposite is also
true. We can, by inappropriate behavior, help to
weaken them.
In this perspective, there are reasons for concern
about the moral as well as the intellectual consequences of current practices in legal education.
Faculty acquiescence in the absence of students from
class and in their failure to participate in class discussion, the willingness of faculty members to tolerate
lack of preparation for class discussion and to accept
unsatisfactory abwers without adequate criticism,
and failure to insist upon compliance with reasonable
deadlines for the submission of written work represent missed opportunities to assist students in
strengthening important moral qualities. Participation
in a well-run class discussion, to take a central example, permits students to overcome fear and to learn
by experience that the embarrassment of public error
may be compensated by the learning that ensues.
By encouraging students to risk the expression of
novel ideas, it may help to develop courage. Faculty
members who simply accept the failure to participate
in class discussion or who accept intellectually sloppy

,

-answers not only miss these opportunities, but act
in a way that is likely to be destructive of the very
qualities they should be cancemed with stwngthening. Students who are permitted to "pass" when
called upon, whether they do so from unpreparedness or fear, are simply reinforced in these
4
tendencies.
Since they have at times been justified as useful in
developing character, I want to make clear that I
not calling for a return to the barbarities that (according to legend) so frequently marred law school classes
in earlier generations and to which, I suspect, current
practices are an ovemaction. Ridicule and humiliation are not effective pedagogical tlkhniques. An
occasional student may meet their challenge, and may
even be strengthened by doing so, but most will
merely suffer, some to the point of diminishing the
self-esteem that is necessary to purposeful activity.
The classroom practices I have mentioned are
important for yet another reason. Among the opportunities that legal education affords for developing
character are the occasions it provides for exemplary
conduct by faculty members. The faculty member
who, in response to a student answer that is wrong
or foolish, demonstrates patience in working with the
student toward a better answer teaches more than an
intellectual lesson. So too does the faculty member
who ridicules students or reveals a lack of concern for
them by inattention to their performance in class.
Ideas about patience, courage, and duty and about
the ways in which men and women ought to treat
one another take on meaning in our lives as we
observe the behavior of those around us, especially
those who occupy positions that might reasonably
lead us to suppose that they are socially approved
models for our own behavior.
A legal education that takes the development of
students as its end will, obviously, also be concerned
with the enhancement of their intellectual capacities.
It is customary, and perhaps useful for some purposes, to distinguish between intellectual capacities
and the moral virtues we have been considering, but
it is important to recognize that the strengthening
of intellectual capacity has a moral dimension. Moral
action depends quite as much upon clarity of thought
as upon purity of motive or strength of character.
The development of intellectual capacity has, of
course, traditionally been regarded as an important,
at times the most important, objective of legal education. It is the objective that is stressed by the familiar,
if no longer very fashionable, statement that the aim
of legal education is "to teach students to think like
lawyers." Rightly understood, that ability is not
merely a professional technique useful only in the
office or courtroom, but a set of skills that is of pervasive importance in life. Among the skills it
encompasses is, for example, the ability to read. The
ability to capture meaning from the printed word and
to understand the possibilities and uses of fixity,
vagueness, ambiguity, and change in language is not
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simply a prokssional necessity. It is iidispewablti
to partitipatiorfin a community of thought h a t
extends beyond very namw boundaries of space,and
time. Similarly, the abilities to identify and & d a t e
the premises of thought and to d d o p arguments
that,flow in an orderly fa ion from those premises
are not simply profession techniqtles, but. capacities
of mind that are essential to understanding the world
around us and to undertaking purposeful activity
within that world.
'
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traditional aim of education, from
which legal education has no'
exemption, is to strengthen the capacity of
students to avoid common hazards to,deaf
thought.
\I

The idea has arisen recently that the skills of
"thinking like a, lawyer," both those that I have mentioned and others, are easily acquired and that,
having learned them in the first year, students might
more profitably spend their subsequent years in law
school learning something else. At least in part, the
idea grows out of dissatisfaction with emphasis on
the case method throughout law achaol. I hold no
brief for the case method-indeed, I agree that it is
overused-but the notion that the skills it seeks to
impart can be learned "once and for all" in the first
year reflects inadequate understanding of those skills,
of the means by w h i h they are developed, and of
the uses of the case method. At some mechanical and
elementary level, no doubt, an able student can reasonably quickly learn to comprehend an appellate
opinion and the techniques by which other cases are
distinguished from it. But the development of these
skills is not, after all, the real aim of the case method.
The abilities to read imaginatively and with attention
to the subtleties of language, to frame and test suitable hypotheses for synthesis, and to detect premises
of thought and errors of logic, all of which the case
method is aimed at developing, are not capacities that
we either have or do not have, in the way that one
either does or does not possess a law school degree.

P

Capacities such as these are the product of continuous struggle to wrest meaning from disorder. Like the
moral virtues considered earlier, they are developed
and maintained only by continually undertaking and
sustaining the activities pertaining to them.
The notion that the skills of critical inquiry, having
been learned in the first year, can be set aside thereafter so that students may devote attention to other
matters suffers from yet another vice, a failure to recognize the interdependence of these skills and of
knowledge. Skill in reading and in analysis and synthesis is broadened and deepened as it comes into
contact with new subject matter. Similarly, knowledge of a subject, except at a very superficial level,
depends upon its having been acquired through the
tools of critical inquiry. These considerations suggest
that the real failing of legal education is not that it
overemphasizes developing the skills of "thinking like
a lawyer," but that it gives inadequate attention to
the use of those skills in dealing with materials and
issues that are not formally legal. The consequence of
that inattention is the curious disjunction that too
many lawyers display, careful craftsmanship in the
performance of professional responsibilities and a
lack of concern for the skills of craft in dealing with
political and social issues. Increased attention to such
issues, which are hardly irrelevant to the study of
law, might lead students to an understanding that the
skills of critical inquiry have uses that extend beyond
the performance of professional tasks.
A good deal more might be said about these intellectual capacities and the role of legal education in
developing them, but I want to turn to a number of
other intellectual qualities with which law school
should also be concerned. A traditional aim of education, from which legal education has no exemption,
is to strengthen the capacity of students to avoid
common hazards to clear thought. I have in mind
such hazards as self-interest, provincialism of time
and place, overdependence on familiar categories of
thought, the inability to tolerate uncertainty, and
sentimentality. The last of these may be used to illustrate the opportunities that legal education affords to
overcoming these hazards.
In Henry Adams' roman a clef, Democracy, a powerful politician is made to complain that a sentimental
young woman whom he is courting has judged his
political behavior by abstract principles. The complaint is made cynically, but even as made it is a
telling reproach to all those who suppose that abstractions and untutored sentiment can serve as an
adequate guide to the conduct of human affairs.
Adams' point is not that principles and feelings are
irrelevant in guiding or judging conduct, but that
both should be informed by a knowledge of life.
Since the case method has taken such a beating in
recent years, it is worth saying that appellate opinions can serve as an especially useful vehicle for the
education of sentiment as well as to teach the importance of approaching abstract principles skeptically.

The latter point is too familiar to require elaboration,
but many will greet the former with astonishment.
Appellate opinions, it will be said, report only carefully selected facts, and even those are often stated in
highly abstract fashion; they are, for that reason,
implausible vehicles for conveying a sense of the variousness and complexity of life. But though it is true
that the opinions are written in that way, it does
not follow that they must be read in the same way. A
skillful teacher will lead students to read opinions
imaginatively, with attention to the human possibilities that lie beneath their abstract language. The
exploration of these possibilities, conjoined with consideration of their implications for judgment, offers
opportunity for developing that fusion of feeling and
intellect we call sensibility.
Two points deserve emphasis. First, legal education
can dull sensibility as well as enlarge it. A failure to
devote class time to probing beneath the abstract
language that judicial opinions typically, and statutes
invariably, employ conveys to students the lesson
that emotion and the complexities of life are irrelevant to law. And by leading students during a
formative intellectual period to think only in abstract
categories, it can dull both feeling and their sensitivity to complexity. But a second point needs also to be
recognized. The appropriate objective is not the
release of feeling, but its education. This requires, as
I have already suggested, bringing feeling into contact with the full range of life's possibilities, but it
also requires that it be brought into contact with
those general ideas that we call knowledge. Raw feeling is transformed as it confronts the knowledge of
economics or anthropology, the ideas of philosophy,
or the accumulated wisdom of law. We ought not to
regard that fact as a source of alarm, but as cause for
celebration and as an opportunity for legal education.
It wlll not have escaped attention that I have as yet
said nothing about the study of law. The qualities
of mind and character I have been considering might
as well be, and often have been, developed outside
law schools. What then, it may be asked, distinguishes legal education from education elsewhere in
the university? The answer, surely, is that law is the
subject of study. Moral and intellectual capacities
are enhanced only by engaging in activities that
require their use. One cannot, for example, learn to
think without thinking about something; students
who attend law school enhance their capacity to think
by thinking about law.
The study of law is not, however, merely a vehicle
for developing moral and intellectual qualities. One
studies law, presumably, to learn about law. An elaborate argument is hardly required, at least before
this audience, to establish that knowledge of law is a
valuable end in itself. Law is a central feature of the
social, political, and economic order. It touches large
areas of life directly, and in some respects may be
said to affect all. The issues with which it deals, the
ways in which it deals with them, and it should per-
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haps be said explicitly, the issues with which it fails
to deal are expressions of the ideas, values, and tensions that may be found within the society. Law thus
offers, as Francis Allen recently put it, "a path to the
worlld,'band one studies it for the same reason that
one studies mything else, to acquire knowledge of
the world. That knowledge is both an end in itself
and a condition for intelligent, purposeful, and therefore moral, action.
To see the study of law in this perspective is to put
to rest any lingering questions, if any remain at this
late date, about the appropriateness of bringing to
bear upon it the knowledge and techniques of other
disciplines. If our object is to enlarge students'
understanding of law, both of its internal operations
and of the ways that it does, should, or can influence
our lives, we kill necessarily seize upon whatever
tools may help to achieve &at object If philosophy
and literary theory shed light upon the uses and limits of language, as it is or might be employed in legal
settings, we need to acquaint our students with
them. So too, if economics generates plausible
hypotheses with regard to the inner dynamics of law
or the dfects of vertical price fixing, learning about
&an is appropriately part of an education in law.
There is yet another reason to draw upon other disciplines in the study of taw. We are all familiar with
Burke's aphorism that "the study of law sharpens the
mind by narrowing it." The same is true, as the
-- ~ d e m
university seems intent upon demonstrating,
vr every other discipline. As John Stuart Mill wrote
ore thm a century ago,

proper ends of education because they are the qualities that men and women require to realize their
human potential and to act as m ~ r abeings.
l
But they
are also the qualities'lawyers require in the p d m mance of their professional respansibilitiee. Courage,
patience, sensibility, k n o w l e e , breadth of perspective, clarity of thought and the other qualities I have
mentioned are essential if lawyers are adequately
to serve their clients and meet the obligations of public service they are so frequently called upon to

T

he proper objects of legal education,
in my view, are to enhance the
capacity of students to think clearly, to rfeel
intelligently, and to act knowingly.
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Experience proves that there is no one study or
pursuit, which, practiced to the exclusion of all
others, does not narrow and pervert the mind;
breeding in it a cIass of prejudice special to that
pursuit, besides a general prejudice, common
ta d narrow specialties, against large views,
from an inca acity to take in and appreciate the
grounds of t em.

K
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The obvious safeguard is to provide students with
the perspecrives of other disciplines, so that they may
acquire an enlarged view of their field of specialty
and of the world of which it is a part.
Many lawyers and law teachers will object to the
goah that I have outlined on the ground that those
goals are appropriate to a liberal education, but
ignore the responsibility of law schools, as professional schools, to equip their students to meet the
latter's professional oblightions. I want to address that
objection bridy in dosing, but before doing so, it
may be useful to restate my argument in summary
form. The proper objects of legal education, in my
view, are to enhance the capacity of students to think
dearly, to feel intelligently, and to act knowingly.
These are, of course, the traditional aims of liberal
education, but they are not f a that reason less appropriate as gods of legal education. The inte11ecWal
and moral qualities I .haye been m d d a i n g are the
3
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undertake. Legal education, wen if viewed solely as
professional training, has no more important objective than assisting students to dwelop these qualities.
It is nevertheless worth asking, if only hypothetically, what the implications might be if there were
some opposition between the qualities required of
lawyers and those that we seek to foster as human
qualities. It is not insignificant that a compelling
illustration does not come to mind. To make the
point, however, I shall assume, though I believe the
truth is otherwise, that intellectual autonomy, including the capacity to hold views that are inconsistent
with a client's interests, is incompatible with effective
advocacy. On that assumption, should law schools
refrain from the effort to assist students in developing
intellectual autonomy? Or, would we wish, rather, to
alter the way in which lawyers' obligations are
defined? In fashioning wen a professional education,
to put the point directly, the qualities that we value
because of their importance to (our understanding of)
what it means to be human take precedence wer the
dwelopment of skills and knowledge that are of
professional utility only.
The more difficult question is whether, as professional schools, law schools are obligated to foster
development of purely professional skills and knowl-

edge in addition to pursuing the goals for which I
have been arguing. The details of a law school program that would both advance those goals and meet
the future professional needs of students are beyond
my present purpose. Let us assume, however, that
there are important professional skills and areas of
knowledge that law schools would ignore if they
were to confine themselves to pursuing the educational goals I suggest as their proper aim.
Law office management offers a convenient example. In using that example, I emphatically do not
intend to trivialize the question. The negligent failure
of lawyers to meet filing requirements is a common
and serious problem. Acquainting students with
techniques for ensuring that deadlines will not be
overlooked would make an important contribution to
the protection of legal rights. Similarly, acquainting
students with efficient management techniques might
permit recent law school graduates more readily to
open their own offices and contribute to reducing the
cost of legal services.
To dispel suspicion that I am stacking the deck,
however, the techniques of trial advocacy may be
taken as another illustration. Once again, I do not
mean to suggest that the subject is unimportant.
Knowledge of the means by which documents are
introduced into evidence and skill in framing questions for direct and cross-examination are, praiky,
essential to lawyers who appear in court. Chief Justice Burger is surely right in maintaining that lawyers
who lack this equipment jeopardize their clients and
contribute to the larger problems of the legal system.
Since lawyers must acquire such knowledge and
skills somewhere-whether by apprenticeship or in a
continuing legal education program or in law
school-do not law schools, which are the only portal
through which all lawyers must pass, have an obligation to provide them?
The answer, in my view, depends upon a judgment about the effect that the provision of such
training is likely to have upon a law school's ability
to puruse the fundamental goals of legal education.
The time, energy, and attention of students and the
financial resources of law schools are limited. A decision is required about the purposes to which they
can most profitably be devoted. In my .~iew,none is
sufficient to justify allocating it to purely professional training. Doing so, unduly sacrifices the ability
of the schools to cultivate the more general intellectual qualities that students require both to realize
their human potential and as prospective lawyers.
It is, moreover, significant that purely professional
training can as readily be offered outside law schools,
but that many of the intellectual qualities discussed
earlier are likely to take root and be cultivated only
within a university. The nourishment of these qualities is the special mission of the university and,
therefore, of law schools within the university. An
unwillingness to dilute our efforts to carry out that
mission does not signify indifference to societal

needs, but a judgment about the ways in which the
university can best serve those needs. Hannah Holborn Gray, President of the University of Chicago,
captured my point precisely in a recent address. The
pursuits of the university, she stated,
. . . are in the first instance self-justifying, not
instrumentally conceived. Its choices should aim
at creating and protecting the conditions of . . .
educational purpose that will sustain principles
and objectives valuable in themselves. The University's special contribution to society will lie
precisely in honoring its own mission and nourishing those activities that look beyond
immediate or narrowly utilitarian ends, in acting
in accordance with those processes which define
and make effective the means to fulfilling the
goals of a community of learning.

It is in the effort to define and fulfill the goals of a
community of learning that law schools can recover a
sense of purpose and a moral foundation for our common undertaking, the education of our students. B
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